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ABSTRACT 
 Autobiographical memory is defined as an individual’s ability to remember events 
that have happened in the past and plays a pivotal role in one’s concept of self. The 
present study investigated the impact of different types of feedback on autobiographical 
memories resulting from stimuli presented in a laboratory setting. 48 undergraduate 
participants were exposed to video-recorded (N=30) and audio-recorded (N=30) scenes 
of an actress performing simple tasks. After a 1-week delay, participants received 
positive feedback (they were accurately told that they had correctly recollected a central 
detail from within two scenes) and negative feedback (they were inaccurately told that 
they had incorrectly recollected a central detail from within four scenes, and were either 
provided or not provided with an explanation as to what the correct answer allegedly 
was) about their memory. The negative feedback procedure (both with and without the 
explanation) produced a significant decrease in belief in accuracy ratings without 
influencing belief in occurrence ratings. The positive feedback procedure produced 
significant increases in belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence ratings. This study 
provided a controlled situation in which belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence 
appraisals could be manipulated simultaneously and provides further evidence of the 
proposed theoretical dissociation between belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence 
appraisals. This study reinforces the importance of distinguishing occurrence and 
accuracy when trying to understand the types of evidence and manipulations that 
influence current memory appraisals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The human brain possesses the remarkable ability to be able to remember 
previous experiences and to store the mental representations for retrieval at a later time. 
This ability is important for many reasons, especially since people make decisions and act 
based on what they remember from their past. In his Basic Systems model, Rubin (2006) 
suggests that multiple different underlying component processes are combined to produce 
distinct metacognitive appraisals (evaluative judgements about the quality and truth-
status of remembered events). The model emphasizes two appraisals that are important 
for remembering: belief (hereafter referred to a belief in accuracy; Scoboria et al., 2014) 
which refers to the degree to which events, when retrieved, are perceived as 
corresponding to the way that the event was in fact experienced in the past; and 
recollection which is defined as the presence of a vivid mental representation for an event 
accompanied by a sense of re-experiencing the past.  
 One major form of memory is known as autobiographical memory, and it refers 
to the storage of memories for events that have happened to an individual (Rubin, 2006). 
This type of memory acts as an important archive of information which contributes to 
one’s concept of self (Rubin 1988). By remembering the things that have happened, 
autobiographical memory helps to shape one’s future thoughts, goals, and actions. Nairne 
and Pandeirada (2016) have proposed that memory systems have been optimized via 
evolution to process and retain fitness-relevant information. This way, people can learn 
and make decisions that will benefit them in the future.  
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Brewer (1996) has also defined autobiographical memory, stating that recollective 
memories are comprised of a belief that an event has occurred in the past, as including 
vivid imagery and feelings of re-experiencing, and that memories are accompanied by a 
sense of correspondence between recall and a previous state of affairs.  
 Rubin (1986; 1992) has stated that autobiographical memory is difficult to define. 
He proposed that the definition should not be set a priori but should reflect the “natural 
cleavages that researchers have found in nature” (Rubin, 1996). Baddeley (1992) defined 
autobiographical memory as the capacity for people to remember their own lives and 
Rubin (1996) adds that autobiographical memories include a narrative structure. He states 
that autobiographical memories are often recollected as stories rather than as fragmentary 
lists of attributes and that this narrative structure of memory is much like the narrative 
structure of other social encounters that include the exchange of information. This is due 
to the recall of autobiographical memories being a social experience, where they are often 
recalled as stories, and the way in which they are told tends to define the social group.  
 There is currently a large body of research that examines the distortion of 
autobiographical memories and there are numerous studies that demonstrate the 
reconstructive nature of remembering. People often remember events differently from the 
way in which they were initially perceived due to post-event influences, and sometimes 
remember experiences that may not have happened at all (Nash & Ost, 2016). For 
example, studies have shown that people can be compelled to falsely remember that they 
were born left-handed (Kelly, Amodio, & Lindsay, 1996), or that they spilled a bowl of 
punch on to the parents of the bride at a wedding (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995). 
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These examples provide evidence that demonstrates how powerful suggestions are in 
creating novel false mental representations for past events.  
The purpose of the current study was to further develop a controlled experimental 
situation (Scoboria & Korcsog, 2017) that allows researchers to examine how people 
react when receiving different types of feedback about existing memories for scenes 
presented in the lab. The goal of this research method is to permit simultaneous 
investigation of the effects of feedback on belief that events occurred (referred hereafter 
to as belief in occurrence; Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010), and the effects of 
feedback on confidence in the recall of event details (hereafter referred to as belief in 
accuracy; Scoboria et al., 2014; Rubin, 2006). This would facilitate further study of the 
previously proposed theoretical dissociation between occurrence and accuracy appraisals 
(Scoboria et al., 2014; Scoboria, Talarico & Pascal, 2015; Scoboria, Nash, & Mazzoni, 
2016; Scoboria & Pascal, 2016; Scoboria & Korcsog, 2017), by potentially further 
demonstrating that they can be measured and manipulated independently.  
Memories can be Altered by Information Encountered after an Event 
 
 Bartlett (1932) was one of the first to make the claim that the content and the 
ways in which events are remembered are socially determined. The notion that memories 
can be systematically altered by information encountered after an event is known as the 
post event information (PEI) effect (Wright & Schwartz, 2010). On an everyday basis, 
one way that people can encounter post-event misinformation is when those who have 
shared the same experience discuss it with one another. Wright & Schwartz (2010) 
reported that participants’ memories for actions that they had performed in the lab could 
be affected by information that was reported by another person. These false memories 
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then occurred both when tested in the presence of the person who suggested the 
misinformation, and when tested individually. This demonstrates that memory reports are 
not always completely based in individual recall, and that sometimes memories can be 
reinforced, inhibited, or changed by what other people say. Because of this, it is evident 
that misinformation effects play a pertinent role in forensic contexts, since people can be 
falsely lead to believe facts based on another person’s recollection. Some details 
mentioned in conversation about a memory can be inconsistent either because one 
witness could have remembered something differently, has paid attention to different 
details, or could have made a mistake in their own account of an event (Paterson & 
Kemp, 2005). To describe this process, Wagenaar and Crombag (2005) introduced the 
concept of “collaborative storytelling”. They state that this collaborative storytelling is 
demonstrated as the mutual reinforcement of ideas, which can occur among people when 
they attempt to judge uncertain information. The authors illustrated their point by 
presenting a legal case where they proposed that when eyewitnesses were confronted 
with information that could not be verified by direct observation, they would use the 
judgements of others to help fill any uncertainties about their own memories.  
 Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978) suggest that the information that is provided by 
others, that cannot be verified by direct observation, is combined into a witness’ memory 
of the event whether it is consistent or misleading to what they recall. This possible 
“misinformation acceptance” is especially believable when it contains a high degree of 
conviction about the new memories (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). They also state that 
allowing the passage of time between the event and the recollection can cause the original 
memory to fade, making a person more vulnerable to suggestion (Loftus, Miller, & 
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Burns, 1978). The more time that passes, the more likely that a person will have 
uncertainties about their memories and could choose to depend on others’ judgements of 
what happened. Classic research by Ebbinghaus (1880) indicates that there is an 
exponential decrease in the level of memory retention after one day (33% of the 
information encoded is remembered), and by seven days memory retention levels off to a 
low point (25% of the originally encoded information is retrieved). 
  Because of this loss of access to retrieval of detailed information, people routinely 
discuss past experiences. Discussion and the incorporation of novel information provided 
by others can be costly in that the objective accuracy of memory reports can change 
(through processes such as collaborative inhibition, information sampling biases, and 
audience tuning) or be beneficial (due to processes such as transactive memory and 
collaborative facilitation) (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). After incorporating feedback from 
conversation into memory, people may not completely agree about the details within 
events, or even that the event under discussion occurred. Thus, people often provide 
feedback to others about part, or the entirety of memories.  
Studying social conversations about memory is important because these instances 
can have a large influence on memory recall and on the accuracy of memory reports 
(Echterhoff & Hirst, 2009). Certain speaker and listener qualities, and prior 
conversational recollections, can also combine to affect the content of memory reports 
(Pasupathi, 2001). Feedback provided about memories even has the potential to alter 
rememberers’ beliefs about whether or not events actually occurred (Scoboria, Boucher, 
& Mazzoni, 2015). These researchers examined reasons that people provided for 
choosing to reduce or relinquish their beliefs in the occurrence of autobiographical 
 6 
 
memories. They found that many recollective and non-recollective sources of information 
can influence decision making about the occurrence of autobiographical events. The 
authors also note that alterations to belief in the occurrence for vivid memories can be 
based on inferential decisions, which are triggered by a variety of external forms of 
evidence, and notably by many different varieties of social feedback received from other 
people.  
 Clark, Nash, Fincham and Mazzoni (2012) studied the effects of social feedback 
on belief in occurrence and recollection for false memories for actions performed in the 
lab. Participants were instructed to imitate actions performed by an experimenter and 
were videotaped while doing so. Later, they were presented with a doctored video 
showing the experimenter performing actions that the participant never imitated. This 
produced high levels of false belief in occurrence and false recollection for these actions, 
and when belief and recollection ratings were taken again following debriefing about the 
doctored actions, belief ratings decreased more than recollection ratings. Thus, social 
feedback had a greater impact on the strength of the participants’ belief in occurrence for 
the false doctored events rather than for strength of recollection.  
People can sometimes resist feedback provided by others about the occurrence of 
events, and resist altering their belief in the occurrence for an event even in the face of 
direct social contradiction (Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001). In some cases, however, 
people do reduce belief in occurrence in the face of social contradiction. This is 
demonstrated in nonbelieved memories, which are memories for events that people have 
reduced their belief that the event occurred; but the event continues to be experienced as 
having vivid recollective features (for example, vivid associated mental simulation is 
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accompanied by a subjective sense of re-experiencing the past) despite this reduction of 
belief in occurrence (Scoboria et al., 2014). Nonbelieved memories are associated with 
lower belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy ratings than believed memories 
(Scoboria & Pascal, 2016; Scoboria, Nash, & Mazzoni, 2017).  
Defining Belief in Accuracy and Belief in Occurrence 
 
 There are at least two specific belief appraisals regarding the veridicality of 
remembering events that are discussed in the literature: Belief in occurrence, which is 
defined as the truth attributed to the occurrence of a past event (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & 
Harvey, 2010), and belief in accuracy, which is the belief in the degree to which what is 
recollected corresponds to the actual details of a prior event (Rubin, 2006). Recollection 
refers to the experiencing of a vivid episodic mental representations for events (Rubin, 
2006). Measures of belief in occurrence, recollection, and belief in accuracy have been 
found to be empirically distinct (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015). Different sources of 
information and processes influence each of these appraisals, and the strength of the 
relationships between them varies depending on the type of autobiographical event(s) 
under study. In research studies when people are asked to report memories for past 
events, they tend to retrieve and describe believed memories that are strong in 
recollection, belief in occurrence, and belief in accuracy (Brewer, 1996; Scoboria & 
Talarico, 2013; Scoboria et al. 2014). 
Appraisals of memory accuracy are thought to arise from cognitive processes that 
are distinct from those that produce recollection (Rubin, 2006). Distinct underlying 
influences have been established for judgements of occurrence, recollection, and 
accuracy (Scoboria & Pascal, 2016). Rubin, Schrauf and Greenberg (2003) provide data 
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that indicates recollection is predicted by perceptual imagery (visual, auditory), and 
emotional content of events, whereas accuracy is predicted by knowledge of event 
setting. Thus, accuracy and recollection appraisals arise from at least partly distinct 
underlying mechanisms. For example, recalling a vivid nonbelieved memory can result in 
a high belief in accuracy rating since the memory is vividly recollected, but without 
accompanying high belief in occurrence ratings since the memory is no longer 
completely believed to have genuinely occurred in the past.  
Feedback Can Affect Ratings of Event Occurrence 
 
Autobiographical memories provide the basis for forming a personal temporal 
schema (Larsen & Conway, 1997), which is one of the reasons why they are important to 
one’s sense of self. Because of this, individuals are sometimes reluctant to relinquish the 
ownership of a personal memory when told that the memory did not occur. Sheen, Kemp, 
and Rubin (2001) define disputed memories as memories for which there is a 
disagreement about who the memory belongs to. In their study, they examined an 
instance in which two twin sisters possessed a disputed memory about being sent home 
from school for wearing a skirt that was too short. Both sisters claimed that the event had 
happened to them and not the other, and they agreed that the event could have only 
actually happened to one of them. Sheen, Kemp, and Rubin (2001) suggest that people 
hold tightly onto memories that are central to defining who they are and that tie them to 
their sense of their own personal histories.   
Two studies by Scoboria, Otgaar, & Mazzoni (2018) examined the effects of 
disconfirmatory social feedback made to correctly recalled memories for actions 
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performed in a laboratory setting. Challenging memories for correctly recalled actions 
(telling people that they did not perform actions that they did in fact perform) was 
associated with lower belief in occurrence and recollection ratings on average compared 
to non-challenged control items, with occurrence ratings affected to a greater extent than 
ratings of recollective features. They reported that challenges that were presented during 
the test caused more instances of memory defense, whereas challenges that occurred after 
the test produced more instances of reduction. Instances of memory defense occur when 
participants discount the feedback that they receive and maintain belief in occurrence, 
thus defending their memory. Reduction happens when participants show some degree of 
reduced belief in occurrence for a memory. The authors stated that what a person 
remembers and what they choose to report are at least partially determined by the reason 
that this remembering occurs in the first place, which is frequently affected by social 
factors. People sometimes find it difficult to completely relinquish belief for strongly-
believed memories (Scoboria, Boucher & Mazzoni, 2014), but occasionally it occurs. It is 
generally difficult since people tend to rely on their memories, and when they are told 
that they have remembered something incorrectly, it may lead them to question or even 
second guess their ability to remember events. As previously discussed, autobiographical 
memories are extremely important to one’s concept of self (Rubin, 1988), and so changes 
to belief for strong and personally central autobiographical memories may lead to 
changes in self-views.  
Scoboria, Nash, and Mazzoni (2016) noticed that while people tend to rate their 
belief for their nonbelieved memories as weaker than their original recollection, many 
nonbelieved memories continue to maintain some degree of belief in occurrence. A 
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variety of studies have placed the study of nonbelieved memories in relation to research 
on more typical believed autobiographical memories and to the phenomenon of false 
memory formation (Scoboria et al., 2014; Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2014; Otgaar, 
Scoboria & Mazzoni, 2014). Some studies have examined the creation of nonbelieved 
memories under laboratory conditions, which is necessary to gain experimental control 
and understand the conditions under which nonbelieved memories come to be; Otgaar, 
Scoboria & Smeets (2013); Scoboria, Otgaar & Mazzoni (2018). These studies have 
further demonstrated that belief in the occurrence for existing memories can be affected 
by feedback from others. 
Feedback can Affect Memory for Details 
 
As previously mentioned, one characteristic of autobiographical memory is that it 
is often influenced by social input (Echterhoff & Hirst, 2009). A study by Merckelbach, 
van Roermund, and Candel (2006) demonstrated that when a participant was 
accompanied by a confederate, they were more likely to incorporate this confederate’s 
recollection into their recall of a scene. The authors were particularly interested in 
examining the effects of providing misinformation that added incorrect details versus 
misinformation that denied correct details. Drawing on Loftus, Levidow, and Duensing 
(1992)’s discrepancy detection principle, which states that a person’s recollections are 
more likely to change if they do not detect the discrepancies between the original event 
and the misinformation, they proposed that it is generally easier to implant incorrect 
details into memory reports than it is to lead individuals to remove correct details. This is 
due to the fact that removing details requires providing misinformation that contradicts 
recollected details. Adding incorrect details can be done using misinformation that is 
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consistent with the script of the scene. Merckelbach, van Roermund and Candel (2006) 
report that denying correct details is as powerful as suggesting incorrect information.  
These results are consistent with those of Wright (2001) and Gabbert (2006) who 
both proposed that misinformation that stems from a witness encountering a confederate 
who provides information that is inconsistent with what the participant recalls, can serve 
to erase details from memory thus altering subsequent reports. This social pressure that 
stems from someone unfamiliar disagreeing with the memory may cause a witness to 
decide to not report details that they may have otherwise included when providing their 
report in isolation. These authors also state that as far as free recall of details goes, 
suggesting erroneous details and/or denying correct details seem to possess a similar 
potential to alter memory. 
Numerous studies have shown that different types of social input can also cause 
errors in eyewitness testimonies. In a classic study by Loftus, Miller and Burns (1978), it 
was demonstrated that when witnesses observe an event and they are provided with 
incorrect information following their observation, their memory for the event could be 
influenced. In this study, participants were presented with an array of slides depicting an 
automobile accident in which there was either a red stop sign or a yellow yield sign at the 
intersection. After seeing these slides, participants were asked to answer a series of 
questions about what they had seen. One of the questions contained either consistent or 
misinformation regarding the type of sign at the intersection. Participants that were asked 
the questions containing the erroneous information were found to be significantly less 
accurate in their memory of the event. These results are indicative of the participant 
falling prey to the misinformation effect, in which the questionnaire had essentially 
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altered their memories for the details within the event, demonstrating that feedback can 
affect participants’ memory for details. 
The Distinction between Central and Peripheral Details 
 
 It is important to understand which details within memory reports may be more 
likely to be affected by feedback. In the eyewitness literature, it is often claimed that not 
all the details within witnessed scenes are remembered equally well. It has been 
suggested by multiple researchers (Christianson 1992; Heuer & Reisberg, 1992) that the 
memory for the gist (central details) of an event is better in comparison to memory for 
less relevant details that are less consistent with event scripts (peripheral details). 
Defining central and peripheral details is sometimes difficult because these details are 
determined by the goal and the context dependence of the scene. Context dependence 
refers to the phenomenon in which it is easier to retrieve memories when the retrieval 
context is similar at the time of encoding and retrieval (the ‘encoding specificity 
principle’; Tulving & Thompson, 1973) In one study, Godden and Baddeley (1975), 
instructed divers to learn lists of words in two environments: On dry land and 
underwater. They found that the divers best remembered words that were recalled in the 
same context that they were encoded.  
 In their Fuzzy Trace Theory, Brainerd and Reyna (2001) suggest that verbatim 
and gist aspects of memories exhibit a dissociation both during storage and during 
retrieval. This indicates that there is an important distinction in abstraction between 
things that are more “central” and “peripheral” to events. Some researchers have 
suggested a practical approach to the problem of identifying central and peripheral details 
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within events. Since a definition that is appropriate for all contexts and situations is likely 
impossible, it becomes necessary to pick an interpretation of the event or a scene that is 
natural and appropriate to the people involved in the situation (Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). 
Central and peripheral details are determined by the ability of the detail to affect the 
meaning associated with the event. Details that, if changed, can result in fundamental 
change in the basic meaning of the event are considered to be central, whereas details that 
have no real impact on the meaning of an event are considered to be peripheral (Yegiyan 
& Lang, 2010).  
For the purpose of this study, central details were determined to be anything to do 
with the central meaning or actions of the scene, whereas peripheral details were defined 
as details that did not contribute to the central actions. For example, in a scene “a girl 
making her bed”, central details included as the presence of the bed and that the actress 
moved a blanket and pillows. An example of a more peripheral details included the 
colour of the bedroom walls (a detail that, if changed, would have little impact on the 
overall meaning of the scene).   
Feedback May Differentially Affect Belief in Accuracy and Belief in Occurrence 
 
 As previously mentioned, belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and 
recollection are theoretically distinct appraisals that contribute to the experience of 
autobiographical remembering (Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2014). There have been a 
number of studies that have demonstrated that belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence 
can be measured separately (for example, Scoboria & Pascal 2016; Scoboria, Boucher & 
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Mazzoni, 2014), but there have been few studies in which the distinction has been 
demonstrated experimentally.  
 Scoboria, Nash and Mazzoni (2016; Study 2) reported that nonbelieved memories 
vary in the extent to which belief in occurrence versus belief in accuracy appears to have 
been affected by the development of the nonbelieved memory. Nonbelieved memories 
are generally characterized by a degree of reduction in belief in occurrence, but some 
NBMs are characterized by higher and others by lower belief in accuracy. When 
examining different sub-types of nonbelieved memories, Scoboria, Nash & Mazzoni 
(2017) were able to sub-divide “classic” nonbelieved memories and “grain of doubt” 
nonbelieved memories based on relatively high or low belief in accuracy ratings. Classic 
nonbelieved memories were characterized by strong recollection associated with 
substantially lower autobiographical belief, whereas grain of doubt nonbelieved 
memories were comprised of belief in occurrence ratings that were substantially higher 
than classic nonbelieved memories. These findings further demonstrated that belief in the 
occurrence and belief in the accuracy for the same memory can differ, further 
documenting their distinction. This research on naturally occurring nonbelieved 
memories is correlational, so research is needed to bring experimental control in order to 
better understand the conditions under which different manipulations affect belief in 
occurrence versus belief in accuracy ratings. 
 Recently, this gap in the literature in which no one had developed a method to 
allow for experimental control over the occurrence and content (details within) 
remembered events when exploring both event occurrence and event details when a 
person’s memory is challenged has been filled. Many laboratory-based experimental 
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approaches that have been frequently used to examine memory are limited because they 
do not allow for the natural narrative structure and narrative coherence that characterizes 
autobiographical memories (Rubin, 2006). Many laboratory-based approaches to 
studying memory use simple stimuli, such as word cues, that do not necessarily elicit 
reports with the narrative structure or level of detail that is associated with genuine 
autobiographical memories. 
Scoboria and Korcsog (2017) created stimuli that contained a greater degree of 
narrative structure by recording 60 scenes of an actress performing simple tasks. By 
doing this, it allowed all participants to be exposed to the same scenes, providing 
experimental control when exploring both ratings of event occurrence and ratings of the 
accuracy of event details when feedback about memory reports was later provided. They 
found that when people are challenged about event occurrence but are provided positive 
feedback about event details, belief in occurrence ratings decreased but belief in accuracy 
ratings remained unchanged. When participants were challenged (given negative 
feedback) about scene details but given positive feedback about scene occurrence; belief 
in accuracy ratings decreased and belief in occurrence ratings increased.  
The current study aimed to further examine this dissociation by focusing on 
providing feedback about the accuracy of participants’ descriptions of specific scene 
details, with the goal of providing further evidence that the appraisals of occurrence and 
accuracy are distinct and influenced by at least partially non-overlapping underlying 
processes. 
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Auditory Memory is Inferior to Visual Memory Accuracy 
 
 It has been demonstrated that visual memory for scenes is very robust (Shepard, 
1967; Pezdek et al., 1989). Cohen, Horowitz and Wolfe (2009) explored whether an 
analogous ability exists within the auditory domain. Participants listened to a series of 
audio recordings with no visual stimuli, or to audio recordings with pictures associated to 
them and then were asked to distinguish old visual and auditory clips from new ones. In 
every situation, whether it was a complex auditory scene such as talking in a pool hall or 
an isolated auditory scene such as a dog barking, auditory memory was systematically 
inferior to visual memory when the clip was paired with a picture. Based on presentation 
of auditory and visual lists of words, Penney (1988) reported that visual presentation 
produced higher recall and recognition than auditory presentation. These results agree 
with the separate streams hypothesis (Milner & Goodale, 1992), which states that there 
are different kinds of input processes for auditory and visual items. 
 A study by Pezdek and Stevens (1984) suggests that information that is seen as a 
video is more salient and easier to remember than auditory information. They determined 
this by exposing children to experimental segments in which audio and video stimuli 
were and were not from the same segment, the video was presented alone, the audio was 
presented alone, or a mismatched condition in which video or audio were presented with 
a mismatched video or audio segment. In the mismatched conditions (segments in which 
audio and video were not from the same segment) they determined that memory was 
reduced for auditory information more-so than visual information by use of 
comprehension and recognition tests. Because of this, they state that video information is 
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more salient and memorable than auditory material, and thus conclude that visual 
information is easier to remember than auditory information. 
Current Research 
 
The preceding literature review demonstrates the impact that social feedback can 
sometimes have on memory for events. When memories are challenged, the social input 
can lead to changes in belief in the occurrence and/or belief in the accuracy ratings for the 
memory.   
 The first research question asked is whether providing different types of feedback 
about memory for the details within experimentally presented scenes will lead to 
differing changes in belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy scores.  
The second, more central hypothesis of this study is that targeting belief in 
accuracy appraisals for specific event details will lead to changes in overall accuracy 
ratings for autobiographical events but will not affect occurrence ratings. It is expected 
that by providing disconfirmatory feedback to participants about their recollection of 
specific scene details, that belief in accuracy ratings will decrease more than in Scoboria 
and Korcsog’s (2017) protocol, in which belief in accuracy was targeted by telling 
participants that they remembered either more than 90% or less than 50% of the details 
from target scenes correctly. By focusing on specific details in this study, it is 
hypothesized that any ambiguity associated with stating “more than 90%” and “less than 
50%” will be eliminated, since there was a possibility that participants could have 
interpreted these messages as “10% wrong” or “50% right” in their study. This should 
strengthen the effect on belief in accuracy ratings by providing more absolute feedback 
about detail accuracy.  
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The third hypothesis is that when participants receive negative feedback (when 
they are told that they incorrectly recollected a central detail) with no explanation about 
targeted details, belief in accuracy ratings would decrease and belief in occurrence ratings 
would not be affected. When participants receive negative feedback with an explanation 
(e.g., the sandwich had mustard not ketchup) belief in accuracy ratings should decrease to 
a greater extent than if no explanation is given. This is because prior research on the 
misinformation effect (Loftus et al., 1978) has demonstrated that people tend to 
incorporate plausible details into their memories for scenes, thus making the feedback 
more believable. As well, it is also hypothesized that when video recorded scene details 
are challenged the decrease in belief in accuracy ratings will be less than when auditory 
scene details are challenged. This is because participants tend to remember video-
recorded scenes more than audio-recorded scenes (Scoboria & Korcsog, 2017).  
CHAPTER 2 
Method A: Pilot Study 
Participants 
 
 19 participants were recruited through the Participant Pool at the University of 
Windsor for the study piloting (79% female, 74% Caucasian; Mage = 22.84, SD = 8.65, 
range 18-56). All participants received academic credit for completing the study. All 
participants apart from those who had visual or auditory impairments were eligible to 
participate.  
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Measures and Materials 
 
  Belief in occurrence. Two items derived from Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal 
(2015) were included to assess belief in occurrence before and after the participant was 
challenged about their memory for the details within the targeted scenes (see Appendix 
C). The items are measured using 7-point Likert-style scales and are averaged to calculate 
the scale score. 
 Belief in accuracy. Two items derived from Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal (2015) 
were included to assess belief in accuracy (see Appendix C) prior to and following 
feedback. The items are measured using 7-point Likert-style scales and are averaged to 
calculate the scale score.  
 CSIV. The Circumplex Scale of Interpersonal Values (Locke, 2000) measures 
trait tendencies regarding need for power and affiliation in relationships. Participants 
responded to 32 items on 10-point scales, indicating the degree to which they act in that 
manner in social situations. A high score on this scale means that the participant is highly 
confident in the particular interpersonal trait in question, and items are scored on a scale 
of (0) “I am not at all confident that…” to (10) “I am absolutely confident that…”. A 
sample item includes “I can express myself openly”. This measure was included as a 
filler activity and for exploratory purposes. 
 Distress Tolerance. The 14-item Distress Tolerance scale by Leyro, Bernstein, 
Vujanovic, McLeish, and Zvolensky (2011) measures the perceived capacity to tolerate 
distress from a multidimensional framework. A high score on this scale indicates that the 
participant does not tolerate distress well, and items are scored on a scale of (1) “Strongly 
disagree” to (5) Strongly agree. A sample item includes “Feeling distressed or upset is 
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unbearable to me”. This is true for all items except #6 “I can tolerate being distressed or 
upset as well as most people” which will be reverse-coded. This measure is included as a 
filler activity and for exploratory purposes. 
 Tolerance for disagreement. This validated 15-item Tolerance for Disagreement 
Scale by Teven, McCroskey and Richmond (1998) measures the degree to which an 
individual can tolerate other people disagreeing with what the individual believes to be 
true. A high score on this scale for items 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 14, and 15 indicates that the 
participant is tolerant to disagreement, whereas a high score on this scale for items 3, 4, 6, 
9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 indicates the participant is not tolerant to disagreement. Items are 
scored on a scale of (1) “Totally disagree” to (5) “Totally agree”. The sample items 
include “disagreements are generally helpful” and “I don’t like to be in situations where 
people are in disagreement”. This measure is included as a filler activity and for 
exploratory purposes. 
Event Recordings 
 
 A JVC Everio GZ-HM200 Dual SD High Definition Camcorder was used to 
record the videos used in this study, and an ASUS Zenbook UX303UA-DH51T Intel i5 
computer was used to record all of the sound recordings used in this study. Each scene 
depicts the same actress, a 15-year old girl, who gave permission for the recordings to be 
used. The scenes were kept relatively similar, meaning that they all consisted of an 
actress doing something that was easy to understand, and she wore the same clothing in 
each scene. Each scene is less than 35 seconds long, and all are relatively simple; 
consisting of a minimum of four steps. All items used in the scenes were common 
household objects. A list of all scenes presented is included in Appendix A and B, with a 
 21 
 
sample being “making a sandwich”. A sample of what one of the scenes looked like is 
found in Figure 1, and a transcription of the text from one of the auditory scenes is 
provided in Appendix F. Sixty scenes were presented to each participant, 30 as silent 
videos and 30 as audio recordings.  
Procedure 
 
 Session 1. After consenting to participate, the participant was seated in front of a 
computer with headphones and watched 30 silent videos and listened to 30 audio 
recordings of scenes of an actress performing routine activities (see Appendix A). These 
recordings alternated randomly between video and audio scenes until all 60 scenes were 
presented, and there were two possible conditions in which the video and audio 
recordings were counterbalanced (participants in condition A received one set of 30 audio 
and 30 video recordings, and participants in condition B received the opposite set of 
audio and video recordings). The participant was told that the audio recordings were a 
prior participant’s description of what was happening in the scene they were watching, 
and to close their eyes and imagine the scene unfolding.  
 Session 2 (one week after Session 1). The second session was divided into two 
parts: (1) The initial recognition phase and (2) The feedback phase. During the initial 
recognition phase, participants completed a memory recognition test composed of 90 
items (the 60 scenes in Appendix A that were actually presented and the 30 distractor 
scenes in Appendix B). First, they were read a brief description of a scene and were asked 
if the scene was presented to them during Session 1 (for example, “were you presented 
with a scene of a girl making a sandwich in session 1?”). If the participant responded 
‘yes’, they were asked if the scene was watched as a video or heard as an audio 
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description; the participant was then asked to give a detailed description about what they 
remembered from the scene. The researcher recorded the entire initial recognition phase 
and informed the participant that their recording was only to be used to check their 
responses and that no one apart from the researchers would hear their responses. 
Participants then rated all scenes on belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy. 
 After the initial recognition phase, the researcher informed the participant that 
they needed to leave to prepare materials for the next part of the study. During this 15-
minute time period, the participant completed the filler measures (Distress Tolerance; 
Tolerance for Disagreement; CSIV).  
 The researcher then returned and provided feedback about a sub-set of 10 items 
from the test. This portion of the pilot study was identical to Scoboria and Korcsog 
(2017) and was not used for subsequent analyses. The ten items were randomly selected 
from amongst those that participants correctly recollected as presented during session 1. 
For two items, the participant was told that they were correct in saying that they saw the 
scene as a video and remembered more than 90% of the details correctly (+/+). For two 
items, the participant was told that they were incorrect and did not actually see the event 
as a video, but that they remembered 90% or more of the details correctly from the audio 
recording of the scene (-/+). For two items the participant was told that they correctly 
identified the event as being presented as a video, but that they recalled at least half of the 
details incorrectly (+/-). For two items the participant was told that they did not see the 
event as a video, and that they recalled at least half of the details incorrectly (-/-). There 
were also two control items in which the researcher did not provide feedback. 
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Participants re-rated belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy immediately after each 
item was re-presented. 
 After the completion of the study, participants were read a debriefing statement 
and the researcher explained the purpose of the study and why deception was necessary. 
The participant was informed of which items the researcher had deceived them for, that 
the recordings were not actually from a prior participant, and that this study does not 
indicate anything about the accuracy of their memory in general. 
 After completing this piloting procedure, the audio recordings of the event 
descriptions were transcribed to text in order to determine which details were most often 
accurately recalled by participants in preparation for the main study.  
Determining Central Details to be Challenged 
 
Research assistants transcribed participant descriptions of scenes word-for-word. 
For each scene, all participant descriptions were read, and key details that were 
mentioned across participants were noted. These details were judged to be central to the 
storyline of the scene and could not have been about the actress’s appearance since this 
remained constant throughout all 60 scenes. Central details were defined as details that 
pertained to the storyline of the scene, that were most often mentioned by participants 
when they described the scene. For example, in the scene of a girl making a sandwich, 
anything to do with the act of making the sandwich could have been counted. A 
minimum of 3, and a maximum of the 4 most often mentioned central details were noted 
in preparation for the feedback portion (Part 2) of the study. For this scene, 44% of 
participants in the pilot study mentioned ketchup on the sandwich, 78% of participants 
mentioned cheese, and 33% mentioned ham. See table 1 for additional examples of 
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details that were selected. If mentioned, these are examples of details about which 
participants could receive feedback. Each target detail was paired with an alternative 
detail that could be included as an explanation as to what the correct answer when 
negative feedback about the detail was provided. The alternative details were all 
plausible, that fit with the storyline of the scene. For instance, an example of an alternate 
detail to ‘ketchup’ was ‘mustard’, because it is a condiment that could have easily been 
put on a sandwich instead. 
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Table 1.  
 
Examples of central details 
  
Scene Prompt Target Detail #1 Target Detail #2 Target Detail #3 
A girl dressing a 
doll 
Doll had blonde hair 
(57%) 
Sitting at a table 
(71%) 
Skates (29%) 
A girl bowling On table (50%) Three different 
colours of pins 
(13%) 
Missed the pins 
the first time 
(30%) 
A girl brushing and 
braiding her hair 
Bathroom (56%) In front of mirror 
(56%) 
Braid down the 
right side (0%) 
A girl making a 
salad 
Lettuce (83%) Cheese (67%) Bowl (67%) 
 
Note. This table depicts some examples of the target details chosen for each scene 
prompt. There were 3-4 target details provided for each scene, and the percentage of 
participants that mentioned these details during the pilot study is provided in the brackets.  
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Method B: Challenging Target Details 
Participants 
 
48 participants were recruited through the Psychology participant pool for the 
main study (81% female, 63% Caucasian; Mage = 22.23, SD = 5.50, range 18-43). All 
participants received academic credit for completing the study. All participants apart 
from those who had visual or auditory impairments were eligible to participate. 
Measures and Materials 
 
 Except as otherwise described, the materials and measures were the same as those 
used for the Pilot study.  
Procedure 
 
 Session 1. After consenting to participate, the participant was seated in front of a 
computer with headphones and was asked to watch a series of 30 silent videos and to 
listen to 30 audio recordings of scenes of an actress performing routine activities (see 
Appendix A). The mode of presentation was counterbalanced among participants. The 
recordings alternated randomly between video and audio scenes until all 60 scenes were 
presented. The participant was told that the audio recordings were a prior participant’s 
description of what was happening in the scene they were watching, and to close their 
eyes and imagine the scene unfolding.  
 Session 2 (one week after session 1). Session 2 was divided into two parts: (1) 
The initial recognition phase and (2) The feedback phase.  
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During the initial recognition phase, participants completed a recognition test 
composed of 90 items (30 presented in Part 1 as video, 30 audios, and 30 presented in 
Part 1 as audio, and 30 distractor items not presented in Part 1). First, they were read a 
brief description of a scene and were asked if the scene was presented during Session 1. 
If yes, they were asked if the scene was watched or heard; the participant was then asked 
to give a detailed description about what they remembered from the scene. The researcher 
noted details (those determined during the pilot study) that had been accurately recalled 
from the scene. The researcher stated that they were recording this part of the study to 
ensure that it was plausible that they would be able to provide feedback about details 
during the feedback phase. The participant was then asked to rate belief in accuracy and 
belief in occurrence for that scene.  
 After the memory test, the researcher then left the room for 15 minutes and 
informed the participant that this was so that they could prepare materials for the next 
part of the study. During this time, the participant completed the filler measures (Distress 
Tolerance; Tolerance for Disagreement; CSIV).  
 The researcher then returned and provided feedback about a sub-set of 8 items 
from the test. For 2 items (one presented as a video, and one presented as an audio 
recording), participants were told that they correctly recalled a certain detail (chosen from 
correctly recollected details from initial recognition phase). For example, “you said that 
the doll was wearing a pink dress, and you were correct.” For 2 items that were correctly 
recalled (one presented as a video, and one presented as an audio recording) participants 
were told that they incorrectly recalled a certain detail but will not be given feedback 
about what the correct answer is. For example, “in the scene of a girl dressing a doll, you 
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said that the doll was wearing a pink dress, you were incorrect.” For 2 items that were 
correctly recalled (one presented as a video, and one presented as an audio recording), 
participants were told that they incorrectly recalled a certain detail and were given 
feedback about what the correct answer was. For example, “in the scene of a girl dressing 
a doll, you said that the doll was wearing a pink dress, you were incorrect. The doll was 
wearing a blue dress.” For these scenes, the pre-determined alternative details were used 
as the explanation in order to keep the feedback constant among participants. There were 
2 control items in which the researcher did not provide feedback. Please see figure 2 for 
the exact script of the different types of feedback. Participants then re-rated the belief in 
occurrence and belief in accuracy items immediately after each item was re-presented. If 
participants did not accurately recollect enough audio-recorded scenes, the researcher 
challenged additional correctly identified video-recorded scenes.  
 After the completion of the study, participants were read a debriefing statement 
and the researcher explained the purpose of the study and why deception was necessary. 
The participant was informed of which items the researcher told them that they were 
incorrect in their memory for, that the recordings in session 1 were not actually from a 
prior participant, and that this study does not indicate anything about the accuracy of their 
memory in general. 
CHAPTER 3 
Results 
 Positive and negative feedback about the accuracy and the source of recall were 
examined for scenes that were seen as a video between groups. The analysis included the 
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examination of the contrasts between pre- and post-scores within the groups of items that 
received the feedback, and between the items that received feedback and the control items.  
Analysis of Belief in Accuracy Ratings for Video Scenes  
 
 Belief in accuracy scores are presented in Table 2 and in Figure 3. There were no 
statistically significant differences between the within-subjects groups prior to the 
manipulation. Ratings for the control items did not significantly change upon re-rating, 
Mean difference = .03 [95% CI -.18, .22]; d = .02. 
 When given positive feedback about a detail], belief in accuracy ratings increased 
significantly by an average of 0.54 [95% CI .33, .77]; d = .41. When given negative 
feedback about a with no feedback about the correct answer, belief in accuracy ratings 
decreased significantly by an average of -0.97 points [95% CI -.57, -1.33]; d = -.72. When 
given negative feedback about a detail and an explanation about what the correct answer, 
belief in accuracy ratings decreased by an average of -.98 points [95% CI, -.56, -1.41]; d = 
-.65.   
Analysis of Belief in Occurrence Ratings for Scenes Presented as a Video 
 
 Belief in occurrence scores are provided in Table 3 and in Figure 3. There were no 
statistically significant between group differences prior to the manipulation. Belief in 
occurrence ratings for the control items did not change upon re-rating; mean difference = 
0.04 [95% CI, -.23, .26]; d = 0.03.  
 When participants were given positive feedback about correctly recalling a detail, 
belief in occurrence scores increased significantly by 0.41 points [95% CI, .22, .63]; d = 
.46. When participants were given negative feedback about a detail but were not given an 
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explanation as to the correct answer, belief in occurrence scores did not change 
significantly, mean difference of -0.22 [95% CI, -.61, .09]; d = -.20. When given negative 
feedback about a detail and an explanation, belief in occurrence scores did not change 
significantly; Mean difference = -0.14 [95% CI, -.56, .24]; d = -.11.  
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Table 2.  
Belief in accuracy scores before and after feedback for scenes presented as a video.  
Type of Feedback Average Scores 
Before Feedback 
Average Scores 
After Feedback 
Average Change 
Score [95% CI] 
Control 5.46 5.49 0.03 [-.18, .22] 
Positive 5.49 6.04 0.54* [.33, .77] 
Negative 
/No Explanation 
5.38 4.41 -0.97* [-.57, -1.33] 
Negative 
/Explanation 
5.65 4.67 -0.98* [-.56, -1.41] 
 
Note: Types of feedback are denoted by positive (+) and negative (-) feedback, and 
statistically significant change in pre-post ratings are denoted by an asterisk (*).   
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Table 3.  
 
Belief in occurrence scores before and after feedback for scenes presented as a video.  
Type of Feedback Average Scores 
Before Feedback 
Average Scores 
After Feedback 
Average Change 
Scores 
Control 6.23 6.27 0.04 [-.23, .26] 
+ 6.34 6.75 0.41* [.22, .63] 
Negative/No 
Explanation 
6.37 6.15 -0.22 [-.61, .09] 
Negative/Explanation 6.38 6.24 -0.14 [-.56, .24] 
 
Note: Types of feedback are denoted by positive (+) and negative (-) feedback, and 
statistical significance are denoted by an asterisk (*).   
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Recognition Accuracy 
 
 Accuracy of recognition for the presentation of visual scenes was strikingly better 
than recognition of audio-recorded scenes (see Table 4). On average, participants correctly 
identified video recorded scenes as “seen” in 53% of cases. This means that on average, 
participants correctly identified on average 15.92 (condition A) and 15.83 (condition B) 
out of the 30 video-recorded scenes that were prompted in Part 1 of Session 2 of the study.  
In order to be receive feedback, participants had to correctly recognize at least 4 video-
recorded scenes (stating correctly that the scene was presented as a video), and then 
correctly identify one of the targeted central details in their description of the scene. Two 
participants correctly identified just 3 scenes as “seen” and mention one of the targeted 
central details in their description of the scene. Both participants did not receive the positive 
feedback condition. Their data was included in the analyses for the other conditions, for 
which data was available. 
 On average, participants correctly recognized audio recorded scenes as previously 
“heard” in just 15% of cases. They correctly recognized 4.88 (condition A) and 3.91 
(condition B) audio recorded scenes on average out of the 30 prompts that were given in 
part 1 of session 2 of the study. Just 16 participants correctly recognized at least 4 audio-
recorded scenes as “heard” during part 1 of the study and correctly identified one of the 
target details. 
 Participants were very accurate at determining that the non-presented scene 
prompts were in fact not presented (see Table 4). They correctly determined, on average, 
that these scenes had not been presented in 94% of cases, as demonstrated by the correctly 
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identifying 28.32 (condition A) and 28.17 (condition B) out of 30 possible not-presented 
scenes.  
Analysis of Audio-Recorded Scenes 
 
 Because of the small number (16 out of 48) of participants that correctly recalled at 
least 4 audio-recorded scenes, challenges made to audio-recorded scenes were examine, 
but due to the small sample size available no conclusions were made. Positive and negative 
feedback about the accuracy and the source of recall were examined for scenes that were 
heard as an audio-recording between groups. The analysis included the examination of the 
contrasts between pre- and post-scores within the groups of items that received the 
feedback, and between the items that received feedback and the control items.  
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Table 4.  
 
Recognition accuracy. 
  
Type of Scene Condition A 
(# correct/30) 
Condition B 
(# correct/30) 
Average 
(# correct/30) 
Video 15.92 (53%) 15.83 (53%) 15.88 (53%) 
Audio 4.88 (16%) 3.91 (13%) 4.40 (15%) 
Not Presented 28.32 (94%) 28.17 (94%) 28.25 (94%) 
    
Note: Average number of correctly identified scenes during Part 1 of Session 2, prior to 
providing feedback to participants. Condition A and B designate which counterbalanced 
order of video and audio recordings they were presented.  
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Analysis of Belief in Accuracy Ratings for Scenes Presented as an Audio Description 
  
 Belief in accuracy scores are presented in Table 5 and in Figure 4. There were no 
statistically significant differences between the within-subjects groups prior to the 
manipulation. Ratings for the control items did not significantly change upon re-rating, 
Mean difference = .09 [95% CI -.62, .80]; d=.085. 
 When given positive feedback about a selected detail within the scene, belief in 
accuracy ratings increased by an average of 1.25 [95% CI .68, 1.82]; d=.84. When given 
negative feedback about a selected detail within a scene with no feedback about the correct 
answer, belief in accuracy ratings did not significantly change, and had an average 
difference of 0.19 points [95% CI -.39, .77]; d = .12. When given negative feedback about 
a selected detail within a scene, that included an explanation about what the correct answer 
was, belief in accuracy ratings did not significantly change, and had a mean difference of 
-.50 points on the scale [95% CI, -1.3, .30]; d = .30.  
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Table 5.  
Belief in accuracy scores before and after feedback for scenes presented as an auditory 
description.  
Type of Feedback Average Score 
Before Feedback 
Average Score After 
Feedback 
Average Change 
Score 
Control 4.44 4.53 0.09 [-.62, .80] 
+ 4.42 5.67 1.25* [.68, 1.82] 
-/No Explanation 3.63 3.81 0.19 [-.39, .77] 
-/Explanation 4.44 3.94 -0.50 [-1.3, .30] 
 
Note: Types of feedback are denoted by positive (+) and negative (-) feedback, and 
significance is denoted by an asterisk (*).  
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Analysis of Belief in Occurrence Ratings for Scenes Presented as an Audio 
Description 
 
Belief in occurrence scores for the two rating items are provided in Table 6 and in 
Figure 4. There were no statistically significant differences between the within-subjects 
groups on belief in occurrence ratings prior to the manipulation. Belief in occurrence 
ratings for the control items did not change upon re-rating. Mean difference = 0.03 [95% 
CI, -.41, .47]; d = 0.02.  
 When subjects were given positive feedback about the accuracy of their 
recollection, belief in occurrence scores increased by 0.84 [95% CI, .29, 1.39]; d = .72. 
When participants were given negative feedback about the accuracy of their recollection 
but were not given an explanation as that what the correct answer was, belief in occurrence 
scores did not change significantly and had a mean difference of 0.53 [95% CI, -.05, 1.11]; 
d = .36. As well, when participants were given negative feedback about the accuracy of 
their recollection and were given an explanation as to why, belief in occurrence scores did 
not significantly change. Mean difference = 0.44 [95% CI, -.27, 1.15]; d = .48.  
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Table 6.  
Belief in occurrence scores before and after feedback for scenes presented as an 
auditory description.  
Type of Feedback Average Scores 
Before Feedback 
Average Scores 
After Feedback 
Average Change 
Control 5.41 5.44 0.03 [-.41, .47] 
+ 5.78 6.63 0.84* [.29, 1.39] 
-/No Explanation 5.22 5.78 0.53 [-.05, 1.11] 
-/Explanation 5.81 6.25 0.44 [-.27, 1.15] 
 
Note: Types of feedback are denoted by positive (+) and negative (-) feedback, and 
significance is denoted by an asterisk (*).  
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Summary of Findings 
 
 In summary, when participants receive negative feedback about the accuracy of 
their memory for scenes presented as a video, belief in accuracy scores significantly 
decreased but belief in occurrence scores were not affected. There were no significant 
differences in the effect between the two types of negative feedback provided about the 
accuracy of specific details (challenge with or without an explanation as to the correct 
response). Providing positive feedback about accuracy (telling participants they were 
correct about a central detail) significantly increased belief in occurrence and belief in 
accuracy scores. 
 When participants received negative feedback about the accuracy of their memory 
for scenes presented as an auditory description, neither belief in accuracy nor belief in 
occurrence significantly changed. Providing positive feedback about accuracy significantly 
increased both belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy scores. However, due to the low 
number of participants who were challenged for auditory scenes, no conclusions can be 
made.  
CHAPTER 4 
Discussion 
 This study aimed to further demonstrate the theoretical dissociation between 
belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy appraisals when people are challenged about 
their memory for events presented under controlled laboratory conditions with scenes 
designed to contain a narrative structure. Scoboria and Korcsog (2017) provided the first 
controlled demonstration of this dissociation, and through the current study the goal was 
to provide further evidence for this distinction by looking at the effects of feedback about 
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specific event details on belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence ratings. The results of 
this study revealed significant decreases in belief in accuracy scores when participants 
were challenged about their memories for the details within scenes, but these challenges 
did not affect belief in occurrence scores.  
The Dissociation of Belief in Accuracy and Belief in Occurrence 
 
 In Scoboria and Korcsog (2017), participants were given different types of 
feedback about event occurrence and memory accuracy. When given positive feedback 
about occurrence and negative feedback about the accuracy of their memories, an 
increase in belief in occurrence and a decrease in belief in accuracy ratings resulted. 
When participants were given negative feedback about belief in occurrence and positive 
feedback about the accuracy of their memory, belief in occurrence ratings decreased and 
there was no significant change in belief in accuracy ratings. These findings were the first 
to suggest that belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence could be manipulated in 
opposite directions based on predictions about the type of information that theoretically 
contributes relevant to each judgement. These findings coincide with those of Scoboria, 
Nash and Mazzoni (2016; Study 2) in which they demonstrated that belief in occurrence 
and belief in accuracy are affected differently for nonbelieved memories.  
The current study aimed to also examine one potential limitation in Scoboria and 
Korcsog’s (2017) methodology in which participants were told that they didn’t see a 
scene, but they heard it to demonstrate a challenge to belief in occurrence. This was a 
limitation because the items intended to measure belief in occurrence instead targeted 
source monitoring (visual versus auditory information) rather than belief in occurrence. 
In the current study, participants did not receive feedback about event occurrence at all, 
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so belief in occurrence was not expected to change under any condition. As well, in the 
prior study participants were told that they either remembered more than 90% or less than 
50% of the details within a scene correctly, leaving room to interpret these values as 10% 
wrong or 49% or less of the details correct. To address this potential limitation, the 
current study targeted central scene details in order to provide participants with more 
direct feedback regarding scene accuracy.  
The Outcomes of Negative Feedback  
 
 It was hypothesized that when participants receive negative feedback about the 
accuracy of their description of the scene, (they were told that they recalled a central 
detail incorrectly), that belief in accuracy ratings would decrease, and that belief in 
occurrence ratings would remain unchanged. This was in fact the case: When participants 
received negative feedback about a certain central detail that they had mentioned, belief 
in accuracy ratings significantly decreased, and belief in occurrence scores remained 
statistically the same. In this study there were two types of negative feedback that 
participants received; negative feedback with no explanation and negative feedback with 
an explanation. The reason for this was to examine the hypothesis that when given an 
explanation about what the correct answer was, belief in accuracy scores should decrease 
further, since it provides a plausible detail to fill the gap that the negative feedback had 
left. It was found however, that providing this detail did not influence belief in accuracy 
scores any further than when participants were not given an explanation.  
The Outcomes of Positive Feedback 
 It was hypothesized that when providing positive feedback about memory 
accuracy, belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence scores would increase. The reason 
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for this is because by telling the participant that they were correct in their recollection of 
a certain detail within a scene, it solidifies any doubt that the scene existed. The findings 
demonstrated that both belief in accuracy scores and belief in occurrence scores did in 
fact increase.  
Strengths and Limitations 
 
 This study was designed to target central details within scenes with the goal of 
causing fluctuations in belief in accuracy ratings after different types of feedback. This 
goal was achieved, demonstrating that the details chosen for feedback were likely central 
in representing the gist of the scene, which is how Christianson (1992) and Heuer & 
Reisberg, (1992) define central details. It is theorized here that because these details 
accurately represented the gist of the scene, there was a significant decrease in belief in 
accuracy scores when the details were challenged.  
 The most notable limitation of this study was the lack of memory accuracy for 
auditory scenes. For most participants, it was impossible to provide feedback about 
auditory scenes because there were not enough of them that were remembered from part 
1 of the study (15% accuracy across both conditions). This replicates Scoboria and 
Korcsog (2017), where participants were only accurately recalling audio-presented scenes 
as presented (as audio) in 21.5% of cases. Because of the low recollection rate, audio-
recorded scenes were not included in the findings of this study. Another limitation of the 
study is that although the target details that were chosen seemed to decrease belief in 
accuracy ratings, choosing one detail within a scene arguably does not direct participants 
to appraise the entire scene. In the prior protocol (Scoboria & Korcsog, 2017), 
participants were told that they remembered more than 90% or less than 50% of the 
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details within scenes correctly. This method lead to a larger decrease in scores (-1.58 
points on average), suggesting that the effect associated with this method of challenging 
memory accuracy is stronger.  
 Another limitation of the study was that the sample of participants was 81% 
female. One study by Pauls, Petermann, and Lepach (2013) suggests that women tend to 
outperform men on auditory memory tasks, whereas males have a higher performance on 
visual memory tasks. This could suggest that due to the low number of male participants 
in this study, the findings may not be generalizable to the entire population. It would be 
helpful in the future to have a larger sample size, so as to have a larger number of male 
participants to determine whether or not there is a significant difference between the 
genders.  
Future Directions and Implications 
 
 By use of both Scoboria and Korcsog’s (2017) study and the current study, it is 
now clear as to which types of feedback more effectively target belief in accuracy and 
belief in occurrence. Potential future directions include providing feedback about 
accuracy that encompasses the entire scene rather than just one detail deemed to be 
central, and feedback about occurrence that more directly challenges whether scenes were 
presented (“the scene was/was not presented”). These methods are needed to fill the 
limitations within this study and in Scoboria and Korcsog (2017), in order to most 
accurately target belief in accuracy and belief in occurrence appraisals in a laboratory 
setting.  
This study has therefore provided further evidence that belief in occurrence and 
belief in accuracy can be dissociated when providing negative feedback about central 
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scene details. Future studies should address the issue of the audio-recorded scene 
inaccuracy to more completely demonstrate this dissociation across multiple sensory 
modalities. This could be remedied by perhaps including fewer scenes in total, or by 
conducting studies that include only audio recorded scenes. The audio-recorded scenes 
could also include a text transcription to be read while the actress is speaking to provide 
another form of encoding.  
 Additionally, future directions for this line of research could include further 
manipulation of belief in the occurrence and belief in accuracy of the recollected scenes. 
In order to manipulate occurrence, it would be interesting to see whether or not 
occurrence scores would be affected if a distractor, such as a series of beeps, was added 
to the encoding phase of the study. This may provide lower initial belief in occurrence 
ratings and could make it more plausible to participants that they did not see scenes that 
they actually did see. This could also affect pre-feedback belief in accuracy scores since 
while distracted, they may not be paying attention as closely to the details of the scene.  
Conclusions 
 
 Past research has described the dissociation between belief in accuracy and belief 
in occurrence but has not done so in a controlled environment that uses stimuli with 
narrative structure that resembles natural autobiographical memories. This study utilized 
Scoboria and Korcsog’s (2017) method in which simple scenes were presented to 
participants in a controlled environment. This permitted the examination of belief in 
accuracy and belief in occurrence appraisals before and after external feedback was 
provided about correctly recalled scenes.  
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 Previously, there has been a lack of research regarding the use of narratively 
structured procedures that consist of the participant being exposed to controlled 
storylines. Both Scoboria and Korcsog (2017) and the current study have allowed for the 
examination of appraisals about entire events at the same time as appraisals within 
events, thus paving the way to fill the gaps of the previously mentioned experimental 
approaches. 
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Figure 1. Examples of simple scenes presented to the participant as a video. The top four 
pictures represent the scene “a girl doing dishes”, the middle four represent “a girl hitting 
a baseball with a bat” and the bottom four represent “a girl making a sandwich”.  
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Figure 2. A pictorial depiction of the types of feedback given to the participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Feedback about scene details 
Positive (+) In the scene ______, you were correct in saying ________. *hand over affect 
rating form*. Now, Please re-rate this scene. 
Negative with no 
explanation 
(-/NE) 
In the scene _______, you were incorrect in saying __________. *hand over 
affect rating form*. Now, Please re-rate this scene. 
Negative with an 
explanation 
(-/E) 
In the scene _______, you were incorrect in saying _________. The correct 
answer was ________. *hand over affect rating form*. Now, Please re-
rate this scene. 
Control (0) Please rate the scene ________. *hand over affect rating form*.  
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Figure 3. This graph demonstrates the dissociation of belief in accuracy from belief in 
 occurrence for scenes presented to participants as a video. The types of feedback 
are presented on the X-Axis, and the average changes of the pre- to post- scores 
are on the Y-Axis. 95% confidence intervals are included. 
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Figure 4. This graph demonstrates the effects of providing different types of feedback 
about participants’ accuracy of their recollections on appraisals of belief in 
accuracy and belief in occurrence for scenes presented as an audio description. 
The types of feedback are presented on the X-Axis, and the average changes of 
the pre- to post- scores are on the Y-Axis. 95% confidence intervals are included. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Recorded Scenes 
 
Each of these 60 scenes were under 35 seconds long and were comprised of at 
least 4 distinct steps. There was a video recorded version of each scene, and an audio 
recorded version in which a research assistant described aloud what they saw in each 
scene. 
1. A girl making a sandwich 
2. A girl washing her hands 
3. A girl painting a picture 
4. A girl styling a doll’s hair 
5. A girl painting someone’s nails 
6. A girl doing a puzzle 
7. A girl placing numbers in a foam board. 
8. A girl doing laundry  
9. A girl mixing liquids 
10. A girl picking a flower 
11. A girl sealing a letter to mail it 
12. A girl writing the numbers 0-10 on a 
piece of paper 
13. A girl blowing up a balloon 
14. A girl opening a present 
15. A girl putting on makeup 
16. A girl stretching 
17. A girl brushing her teeth 
18. A girl making a coffee 
19. A girl dressing a doll  
20. A girl eating dinner 
21. A girl making something out of clay 
22. A girl chewing bubblegum 
23. A girl doing math problems 
24. A girl doing exercises 
25. A girl lighting candles 
26. A girl washing her face 
27. A girl dealing playing cards 
28. A girl colouring in a colouring book 
29. A girl setting the table 
30. A girl fixing a remote control 
 
31. A girl writing in a card 
32. A girl doing a craft 
33. A girl painting Christmas ornaments 
34. A girl cutting a snowflake out of paper 
35. A girl making a paper airplane 
36. A girl sorting coins 
37. A girl flipping through a textbook 
38. A girl putting tape on a bird house 
39. A girl bowling 
40. A girl putting on a rollerblade 
41. A girl brushing and braiding her hair 
42. A girl making a salad 
43. A girl making an ice cream sundae 
44. A girl sealing a letter to mail it  
45. A girl dancing 
46. A girl throwing a toy for her dog 
47. A girl kicking a soccer ball 
48. A girl making a phone call 
49. A girl making her bed 
50. A girl bouncing on a trampoline 
51. A girl making batter for a cake 
52. A girl placing coloured beads on to a 
string 
53. A girl drawing on a pumpkin 
54. A girl placing coloured circular stickers 
on paper 
55. A girl drawing a rainbow 
56. A girl making a dog do a trick 
57. A girl making tea 
58. A girl doing dishes 
59. A girl doing a cartwheel 
60. A girl hitting a baseball with a bat 
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Appendix B: Scenes that were Not Presented 
 
 These 30 scenes were randomly distributed within part 2 session 1’s total of 90 
scenes. These scenes were not video or audio-recorded and were just meant to be used to 
increase the number of scenes participants were asked about.  
1. A girl cutting her nails 
2. A girl organizing her pencil case 
3. A girl playing games on an iPad 
4. A girl brushing a kitten 
5. A girl washing a car 
6. A girl sewing fabric 
7. A girl planting a flower in a garden 
8. A girl making a gingerbread house 
9. A girl flossing her teeth 
10. A girl drawing a family portrait 
11. A girl flying a kite 
12. A girl making a pillow fort 
13. A girl playing the piano 
14. A girl munching on cookies 
15. A girl opening and closing a window 
16. A girl cleaning the bathroom sink 
17. A girl playing a board game 
18. A girl pumping air into the tires of her bike 
19. A girl diving into a swimming pool 
20. A girl stapling paper together 
21. A girl studying for a test 
22. A girl playing bingo 
23. A girl writing her name 3 times 
24. A girl tracing her hand on a piece of paper 
25. A girl printing out pictures from a printer 
26. A girl sharpening a pencil and writing with it 
27. A girl using a calculator to solve a math 
problem 
28. A girl hammering a nail into a piece of wood 
29. A girl washing her windows with a squeegee 
30. A girl putting on a sweater 
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Appendix C: Belief in Occurrence and Belief in Accuracy Items 
 
Belief in Occurrence: 
1. How likely is it that this scene was presented?  
1 Definitely did not view; 7 Definitely viewed 
2. It is true that this scene was presented.  
1 Not at all true; 7 Completely true 
 
Belief in Accuracy: 
1. How confident are you that your memory for this scene is accurate?  
1 Not at all confident; 7 Completely confident 
2. What proportion of your memory for this scene is accurate?  
1 Not at all accurate; 7 100% accurate 
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Appendix D: Participant Pool Advertisement 
 
Title: Remembering Recorded Events 
Duration: 2 hours 
Bonus points: 2.5 
 
Description: If you volunteer to participate in this study, we will ask you to watch or 
listen to simple scenes (such as “making a sandwich”). One week later, we will ask you 
will complete a test of your memory for the scenes. The first session will take one hour to 
complete, and the second session one hour, for a total of no more than two hours of your 
time. 
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Appendix E: Post-Study Debriefing 
 
So that was the last question I had for you. I’m just going to tell you a little bit 
more about the study. 
First of all, thank you for your participation. This study is examining how people 
make decisions about their memories for past events. While we might be tempted to think 
of our memories as fixed in our minds, research has shown that memories are 
continuously being influenced by new information and experiences that we have. This 
has led some researchers to study how people make decisions about memories when they 
encounter different types of information. 
In this study, we are interested in seeing what people do when feedback is given 
that specific details within memories are incorrect. In this study there were two phases. 
First, you studied many different simple scenes – some you watched and some you heard. 
The second phase, the memory test, occurred today. You may recall that after you 
completed the memory test there were a few times I gave you feedback that your memory 
for specific details within scenes was incorrect. For some of the memory test items, your 
memory may have been incorrect – you might have said you saw a detail within a scene 
that you did not see in the first phase. However, the feedback I gave you that your 
memory was incorrect during the second phase today was false. We are interested in 
seeing how people react to feedback that strong memories are incorrect. In this study, we 
are specifically examining how often people reject versus how often they accept the 
feedback, and whether features of the memory such as vividness predict that outcome. 
So there was a type of deception in this research. For a small number of scenes 
that you correctly identified as being seen, the feedback I gave you was incorrect. We 
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apologize for the need for the deception, but there really is no way to study how people 
respond to feedback from others without sometimes contradicting accurate memories. 
This situation is a bit like when people who are close argue about what ‘really happened’ 
during a shared experience. Sometimes, some of the feedback we get from others is 
correct and sometimes it is not. The only way we can gain control of it for study in the 
lab here is to sometimes provide erroneous feedback. 
Now that you know about the study, do you agree for us to keep the data that we 
collected? 
Do you have any questions, or anything else that you would like to tell us about 
what it was like for you to participate in this study? 
 
Thank you again for participating. [Arrange compensation; crediting of bonus points] 
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Appendix F: Example of Research Assistant’s Script for Audio Recording 
 
“So there was a woman standing in a kitchen and she had a piece of bread and she was 
cutting it with a knife. Um, and then she uh, she had to pull it apart. A-and it wasn’t like 
totally even. And then uh, she had some stuff she was putting on it. So, I think there was 
meat and cheese, and then she had condiments so there was some ketchup. And, uh that 
was it. She made a sandwich.” 
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